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ABSTRACT
Selgelid and Koplin’s article ‘Kidney Sales and the Burden of Proof’ (K&S 2019) 
presents a series of detailed and persuasive arguments, intended to demolish my own 
arguments against the prohibition of organ selling. And perhaps they might succeed, 
if the case described by the authors were the one I actually make. However, notwith-
standing the extensive quotations and the detailed explanations of the way I suppos-
edly argue, this account of my position comprehensively mistakes both the conclusions 
I reach and the arguments I give for them.
I know that there are around many misconceptions about my views on this 
subject, but I have always hoped they could not survive a reading of what I had actu-
ally written. I have just—after a gap of many years—looked again at the two most 
recent of the texts Koplin and Selgelid refer to, and it goes without saying that I can 
see various things I could now do better; but I do still fi nd these misinterpretations 
hard to understand. And since anyone with nothing to go on but this article would 
reasonably conclude that the original texts were not worth reading, I am grateful to 
the editors for the opportunity to try to set the record straight.
I presume not many readers would be interested in a detailed comparative com-
mentary on the texts, showing where this account gets my intentions wrong. I shall 
try instead to explain how what I do mean—and what I think I say—diverges from 
what is said here, and then go on to a brief outline of what my arguments and conclu-
sions really are. I hope this may also give some sense of why, for all the opposition I 
have encountered since I was fi rst drawn into this debate, I persist in thinking that 
the work I have been doing is important not only for this topic but for analysis in 
practical ethics more generally.
Volume 7, Issue 3
Not A Defence Of Organ Markets 55
1. MARKETS 
The fi rst, crucial, misunderstanding, which underpins and vitiates everything 
that is said in the article, appears in the abstract as well as throughout the text. I em-
phatically do not argue for “markets” in organs, let alone for minimally restricted 
markets (K&S 2019, p.44). I certainly do not suggest that payment of living donors 
is an inherently desirable means of acquiring organs, let alone that it is better than 
other means. In fact, I do not argue for any “policy” whatever. What I do is argue 
against the total prohibition of payment for transplant organs that was put in place 
pretty well instantaneously when the practice came to light, and has remained, for 
most people involved in policy making, a fi xed principle ever since. That is a totally 
diff erent matter.
There is more to say about this, and I shall clarify further later, but the idea that 
opposition to a principle of total prohibition amounts to an advocacy of markets, or 
any other positive policy, is a straightforward mistake—made, I presume, by the many 
people who seem to think I am an advocate of markets. To be against the total pro-
hibition of anything—abortion, recreational drugs, homosexual practices or what-
ever—is not in itself to commit yourself to anything at all about what should happen 
in the absence of total prohibition. There are indefi nitely many possibilities. And in 
fact I make this explicit (JRR 2012, p.57):
To argue that prohibition is unjustifi ed is to leave wide open the question of what 
arrangements for regulation there should be if payment were not totally prohibited.
And later (JRR 2012, p.103)
The arguments…do not reach any positive conclusion about what policies and ar-
rangements there should be about payment. The starting point of the enquiry is 
the absolutely minimal claim that there is a presumption against total prohibition, 
and the conclusion is the equally minimal one that this presumption still stands. 
This conclusion merely opens up rather than settles the question of what kinds of 
restrictions and regulations there should be—including, possibly, in some places and 
at some times, a total ban.
Opposition to total prohibition is compatible with recommending unregulated 
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markets, or state monopoly of buying, or sales so stringently controlled that hardly 
anyone could meet the required conditions, or even, for that matter, allowing trans-
actions only on alternate Tuesdays.
In fact I have no fi xed views about policy at all, and for what it is worth I fi nd the 
idea of the sale of organs from living vendors as horrible as does everyone else. But 
what I do think is that there have been from the outset deep intellectual, and therefore 
moral, confusions at the root of this issue, and that these have corrupted the debate 
ever since. My concern is with these confusions. You can identify mistakes without 
making any claims at all about what should happen if the mistakes were removed, just 
as a mathematician might expose (crucial) miscalculations in the plans for building a 
bridge without making any claims about how bridges should be built. I am engaged 
not in policy making—for which I am totally unqualifi ed—but in what Locke, if he 
had been writing in this context, might have called sweeping away the rubbish that 
lies in the way of policy discussions (Locke 2001, p.13). That is far from suffi  cient for 
resolving debates about policy, but it is an absolutely necessary contribution to them 
if they are to be morally serious.
2. BURDENS OF PROOF
This mistake seems to be the root of the second, which is a global misconception 
of what is going on in the burden of proof argument (JRR 2012, pp. 14-17). I am not 
sure about the details of where this goes wrong, because I am not entirely sure what 
the authors think I think. But the idea seems to be that I am engaged in two—way 
contest between a policy of prohibition and a policy of markets, and that I illegiti-
mately think I can settle the case in favour of markets by arbitrarily claiming that the 
prohibition side bears the burden of proof, which its proponents cannot meet.
Whether or not I am right in thinking this is what they think I think, it is certain-
ly not what I say. My question is simply whether a global policy of total prohibition, 
almost universally put in place as soon as the issue came to light, is justifi ed. And the 
burden of proof argument is essentially that this policy is on the face of it seriously 
at odds with values and principles normally professed by most advocates of prohibi-
tion themselves. It is straightforwardly in confl ict with the normal liberal principle that 
competent people should be allowed to judge their own best interests, and make mu-
tually benefi cial exchanges that harm no one else. It is also in striking tension with 
our general presumption that it is an intrinsically good thing to get organs to save 
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lives, and that it is an intrinsically bad thing to reduce the choices available to people 
who are already badly off , into which category come most potential vendors.1
It was striking that when the organ selling issue fi rst arose, these drawbacks of 
prohibition were not even mentioned. Nobody seemed to consider the matter of 
sending a would—be organ vendor back to the daughter whose life he could now 
not aff ord to save, or the would—be purchaser who would now go back to death or, 
if lucky, dialysis. Nobody commented on the dissonance of prohibition with our 
normal principles of liberty and autonomy. But to anyone who holds these values, 
there is a presumption—a prima facie case—against prohibition. This does not mean 
that prohibition is unjustifi ed, but it does mean that—by the standards of anyone 
who holds these values, which as far as I know is everyone in the debate—it needs 
justifi cation.
As I say in the book, this is “purely a methodological device for getting the argu-
ment into order” (JRR 2012, p.46). All it does is make clear the problem that needs to 
be addressed: a tension between the immediate impulse to ban organ sales and other 
values held by people involved in transplant debates, but which was apparently not 
noticed in the original rush to prohibition. It is certainly not proposed as a means for 
“resolving” (K&S 2019, p.37) debates about practical ethics in general (I only wish 
there were such a means), but just for making the structure of this particular problem 
clear. It does not “stack the odds” (K&S 2019, p.37) against anyone, because it amounts 
simply to a challenge to people who hold sets of beliefs that seem to be in tension to 
show that the two can be reconciled, or to give up one of them.
So the burden of proof challenge is essentially this. If you accept the general 
principle that people should be allowed to decide their own best interests, and that 
it is intrinsically good to save lives and increase the options for the badly off , and 
you want a general principle that curtails all these in the area of organ selling, you 
need a justifi cation. And unless you are willing to give up the familiar background 
principles, which no one seems willing to do, the default is, by your own standards, that 
total prohibition is unjustifi ed.
1.  K&S write as though the starting point of the argument is only the second of these three: 
the inherent desirability of getting organs for transplant. This is because, although they mention a 
series of my articles in this area, the discussion in their article is entirely rooted in the book, and the 
book as a whole specifi cally deals with questions about the justifi ability of obstacles placed in the 
way of various kinds of organ procurement. In all the earlier articles—with which K&S seem to be 
familiar—I mention all three of these issues; and in the earliest most of the stress is on the reduction 
of options of the would-be vendors. If I had anticipated that the discussion in the book would be 
treated as a general discussion about prohibition, rather than just as about its limiting organ pro-
curement, I might have done it diff erently. However, it makes no diff erence to the substance of the 
argument.
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From then on, the rest of the debate is about whether the proposed justifi cations 
work.
3. THE CRITICISMS
The detailed criticisms in the numbered sections of the article form its main 
substance.
I have nothing to say about the criticisms in the fi rst section and its three subsec-
tions (K&S 2019, pp.41-46), since they are all directed at arguments I do not use, to 
conclusions I do not reach.
Criticism 2 (K&S 2019, pp.47-48) about starting presumptions, I don’t follow. 
My only starting presumptions are the ones mentioned in the previous section. The 
only one mentioned in the book is the presumption in favour of getting life—saving 
organs (JRR 2012, p.45).
Criticisms 3 and 4, about excessively high standards of evidence (K&S 2019, 
pp.48-52) and failure to allow for the cumulative eff ect of arguments (K&S 2019, 
pp.52-53), will be addressed in the fi nal section below.
It is however, worth mentioning a couple of points in the second section of criti-
cism 1, (K&S 2019, p.42ff ) about appealing to diff erent goals, because these make mis-
leading or false claims about what I say.
First, in asserting that the supply of transplantable organs can be increased in 
any number of ways, and listing several (K&S 2019, p.43ff ), the text seems to imply 
that in my supposed enthusiasm for markets I somehow overlook these much nicer 
possibilities for organ procurement.
But I don’t overlook them; in fact I specifi cally mention them (JRR 2012, pp.91-
94). It is quite common for people arguing in defence of prohibition to say ”there 
are better ways of getting organs!” as if this provided a justifi cation, and I do discuss 
this claim. It is true that I don’t go into the details of what these better ways might 
be, but this is not because I have any doubt that they exist. It is because, once again, 
I am discussing not the general question of what the best policies for organ procure-
ment might be, but the specifi c claim that the possibility of their existence provides 
a justifi cation for prohibition. From this point of view the details of better ways are 
irrelevant because, I argue, the line of argument does not work anyway. If these ways 
of getting organs could produce enough of them, there would be no point in prohibi-
tion because it would have nothing to do: nobody would want to buy, and nobody 
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would be able to sell. And conversely, if they did not produce enough, prohibition 
would still be preventing potential buyers and sellers from doing something that 
might benefi t both.2 The implication that I have overlooked these things again comes 
from the idea that the overall topic is how best to get organs, and that I am advocating 
markets in organs.
Then, very important, is the claim that I defend minimally regulated markets 
(K&S 2019, p.44). I do no such thing. There is here a reference to p146 of the book, 
and (looking at it again) I can see how a quick glance, from the standpoint of someone 
who already presumed that I was engaged in a defence of markets, might suggest that 
I was objecting to regulations as such. But this interpretation is possible only if the 
surrounding context is ignored. I do criticize certain proposals that have been put 
forward for organ markets, and I do claim that the particular restrictions some of 
them propose are not justifi ed. But the context makes it clear that the criticism is not 
of restrictions as such; it is that these particular restrictions have not been justifi ed. 
Criticizing the justifi cations of particular forms of restricted markets is very diff erent 
from criticizing restrictions as such.
The section in which this appears is the fi nal section of the chapter 
“Methodological Morals”, which is crucial for understanding the way the line of ar-
gument works as a whole. But apart from this totally mistaken, or at least seriously 
misleading, claim about what I say about restrictions, the article shows no indication 
at all of awareness that this chapter even exists. It is perhaps not surprising that it also 
shows no recognition of what my arguments and conclusions actually are.
I do say at the beginning of this chapter that anyone whose overriding concern is 
to get on with the practicalities of the problems can (temporarily) omit it and move on 
to the next. Perhaps I should have said explicitly that this exemption did not apply to 
anyone who was specifi cally setting out to discuss the methodology.
4. OVERVIEW
I have never had any interest in promoting organ sales. My interest in this subject 
has from the outset been the extraordinary state of public debate, and the potential 
for harm that lies in all the mistakes of reasoning that are habitually made. My purpose 
2.  A similar sounding, but quite diff erent, argument is that allowing organ sales might in practice 
reduce procurement by these methods (JRR 2012, p.94ff ). These tend to be confl ated. The diff erence 
is discussed in the book.
Journal of Practical Ethics
 JANET RADCLIFFE RICHARDS60
in the various iterations of this subject has been not to keep repeating the same point, 
but to use the persisting interest in it to try to clarify various aspects of methodology 
of argument in practical ethics. This is a diffi  cult and slow process—or at least I fi nd 
it so—and it is still ongoing. In the book I made some advances on earlier attempts, 
especially in the chapter just mentioned. Here I will try to pull together various ele-
ments of the book more tightly than I managed there. I shall also explain what my 
practical conclusions really are—nothing to do with the establishment of markets in 
organs—and outline how the arguments to those conclusions are supposed to work. 
In doing so I shall reply to criticisms 3 and 4 in the article.
To do this I will make use of two distinctions made in the book. K&S mention 
these, but they seem to regard them as the same (K&S 2019, p.39ff , including foot-
note), and do not discuss the signifi cance of either of them. Perhaps I can make things 
clearer here.
The distinctions are between:
Arguments in defence of prohibition that appeal to principle, and ones that 
depend on practicalities (principle vs. practicality defences)
Policies reached as the conclusions of arguments, and principles introduced 
as constraints at the beginning (constraints vs. policy debates.)
These need explaining. Take the second fi rst.
When we debate policies in practical contexts, there are usually constraints we 
take for granted from the outset: ranges of possibilities that we refuse even to con-
sider. Debates about policies for organ procurement have always taken place against 
established principles that were in place long before transplantation was possible: no 
murder, no kidnapping, a requirement of valid consent (JRR 2012, pp.32-35). But there 
could in principle be a quite diff erent debate, about whether we should change these 
background rules. You might argue that since the organs from one person could save 
the lives of many, surgeons should be allowed to go out and kidnap people when they 
needed spare parts, we should modify existing rights to allow for it; or, perhaps, that 
criminals should be deprived of these rights, as has been said to happen in China 
(JRR 2012, pp.23-25). At the moment nobody seems to suggest that we should change 
our current background rights, but we can recognize it as a possible subject of debate, 
distinct from current policy debates that take place against the background of those 
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rights. And if we did change the background rights, subsequent policy debates would 
be diff erent. This means that the question of what the background framework should 
be is logically prior to questions of policy within a framework. The two kinds of ques-
tion are distinct.
What I am arguing is that the organ selling debate must be recognized as falling 
into two parts in the same way. First, there is the question of whether there should 
be a principle of prohibition, constraining all subsequent debates about organ pro-
curement in practice. If there is a constraining principle, that settles prohibition as 
a practical conclusion. But if it is decided that there should be no such overriding, 
constraining principle, that leaves detailed questions of policy wide open. The ques-
tion of whether prohibition should be established in particular circumstances would 
remain open, to be determined by whatever other moral and practical considerations 
did frame the debate. It might still be decided at particular times and in particular 
places that there should be a policy of prohibition, but not because it was entailed by 
a general principle. Both these debates are about prohibition, but they are quite dif-
ferent, and it is essential to distinguish them.3
Now the prohibition of organ selling happened as soon as the practice came to 
light, initially without argument or discussion, as if it should obviously be a constraint 
on future debates about organ procurement in the way the prohibition of murder 
and kidnapping are. And so it has remained ever since. The policies of the World 
Health Organization, and the Declaration of Istanbul (JRR 2012, p.83) are striking il-
lustrations of this. Nearly all practical debates about organ procurement policies still 
take place against the background of prohibition as an established constraint. So the 
fundamental question about prohibition is not about details of practical policies, but 
about whether it is legitimate as a fi xed starting position for all detailed debates about 
procurement policy.
This is where the burden of proof argument comes. Most people who immedi-
ately agreed on the principle of prohibition also normally accept our values of auton-
omy, life—saving and expanding options; but prohibition is in tension with all three, 
and so calls for justifi cation. And indeed, the point is implicitly conceded by the fact 
that since the problem was raised in this form, there has been a never—ending stream 
of proposed justifi cations. The next stage of the debate is to assess these.
3.  In the book (141) I argue that it is a mistake to consider the second kind of question as being 
about prohibition at all. That is a detail, but important.
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And here is the relevance of distinction 1, above, between attempted justifi ca-
tions depending on principle and ones appealing to practice. They are usually not 
distinguished in the debate, but the diff erence is important, as will appear.
The fi rst justifi cations off ered for total prohibition were usually ones that ap-
pealed to existing principles—ones that are normally, already, accepted as constraints 
on what can be done. For instance, many took the form of claims that organ vendors 
could not satisfy the requirement for valid consent. If that had been true, it would 
have followed that organ selling could be ruled out directly, on the grounds that it 
could not comply with existing rules for valid consent, in spite of the prima facie case 
against prohibition. Prohibition would be directly entailed by the consent require-
ment. Many other proposed justifi cations have worked in similar ways, as appeals to 
existing standards.
There is obviously no space, here, to go into the details. But in sum, my claim 
about arguments of this kind (pp 58-94) is that they all fail on grounds of ordinary 
rationality. The conclusions do not follow from the premises, or the premises are in 
confl ict with what their proponents would accept in other circumstances, or there is 
no coherent principle at all (105).
Now, to go back to K&S, these are presumably the arguments that their criticism 
4 complains that I take separately, without considering their cumulative eff ect. And 
indeed I do, but this is because arguments of this kind must be discussed separately, 
simply because they are arguments: claims that the principle of prohibition follows 
directly from some already accepted principle. Each of these arguments is off ered in-
dividually as a justifi cation for prohibition, and if the argument fails to support the 
conclusion, it is simply useless. It is not like weak evidence, or small considerations 
in favour, which may indeed be used cumulatively. Arguments of this kind cannot be 
used in that way, because if they fail they have no weight at all. The idea that failed 
arguments have some value if taken together is what Antony Flew called the “ten 
leaky buckets fallacy” (Flew 1966, pp.62-63). If a bucket won’t hold water, you are not 
helped by having ten of them.
This is one reason why it is important to recognize the distinction between the 
arguments for prohibition depending on principle and the ones depending on prac-
ticalities. The second kind of argument, claiming that prohibition is best all things 
considered, does indeed depend on cumulative evidence about how diff erent policies 
will turn out. And here, I presume, is where K&S would advance their claim that I 
demand unreasonably high standards of evidence: the ones I describe on pp94-101.
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But here again is a point where it is essential to bear in mind the distinction 
just described between the two possible kinds of debate: about prohibition as a start-
ing constraint, and about prohibition as a particular policy in the absence of such a 
constraint.
Suppose that there were no general principle against payment and you were 
considering particular policies for regulating payment for organs, say in a particular 
country at a particular time. There might be dozens of proposals on the table, in-
cluding one of outright prohibition. In such a case of course cumulative evidence 
in favour of diff erent possibilities would be relevant, and the same standards of evi-
dence and argument would apply to them all. This is also a context in which it would 
be entirely appropriate to consider harms that might happen, and how likely they were 
to happen: the kinds of consideration listed on K&S 2019, p.42ff . These are the sorts 
of practical issue raised throughout the literature of opposition to prohibition—the 
kinds of issue I think I am being accused of disregarding—and of course they would 
all be important to consider in that situation.
But we are not in that situation, and these practical problems are not under 
current discussion. The question here is that of whether prohibition should be in 
place as a matter of constraining principle, as it is now, ruling out policies involving 
payment before detailed procurement policy discussions even begin. It is in this 
context that I claim that if evidence of this cumulative kind is used, an extremely 
high standard of proof should certainly should be required. A line of argument 
based on claims about a preponderance of harms over good would need to show that 
a constraining principle of no payment would do better than any possible arrange-
ment that did allow for payment. Even if that were possible even in principle (which 
I doubt) it would certainly need overwhelmingly strong evidence to overcome the 
presumptions against prohibition.
So that is my answer to the challenge, in section 3, that I demand unreason-
ably high standards of evidence. If I had been defending a particular policy, such as 
markets, against others, in a situation with no background constraint of prohibition, 
those evidence requirements would indeed be far too high. But I am discussing the 
logically prior question of whether there should be a prohibition constraint at all, and 
that would certainly require exceedingly high standards of evidence. I fi nd it incred-
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ible that anyone recognizing the nature of the challenge could regard us as having 
anything like adequate evidence yet.4
Even if someone wants to dispute that, however, another thing is certain, which 
is that we certainly could have had no such evidence when prohibition was fi rst in-
troduced. If any of the arguments of principle had worked, deriving prohibition from 
existing principles such as the need for consent, that might have justifi ed the im-
mediacy of the prohibition response. We might have seen directly that there was a 
confl ict between allowing organ selling and already entrenched principles. But these 
other attempts at justifi cation of prohibition as a principle, depending on empirical 
evidence, could not possibly have provided a justifi cation at the time. This means 
that the shift from arguments of principle to all—things—considered arguments 
amounts to an implicit admission that there was no justifi cation when prohibition 
was originally, instantaneously, adopted.
And this leads to my second practical conclusion, which I will introduce here, 
as in the book, with a favourite quotation from Mill, anticipating modern moral psy-
chology by 150 years:
So long as opinion is strongly rooted in the feelings, it gains rather than loses in 
stability by having a preponderating weight of argument against it. For if it were 
accepted as a result of argument, the refutation of the argument might shake the 
solidity of the conviction; but when it rests solely on feeling, the worse it fares in 
argumentative contest, the more persuaded adherents are that their feeling must 
have some deeper ground, which the arguments do not reach; and while the feeling 
remains, it is always throwing up fresh intrenchments of argument to repair any 
breach made in the old (see JRR 2012, p.108).
Everything about the organ selling debate exemplifi es this. A strong feeling 
against organ selling leads to a determination to keep prohibition by one means or 
another, and when one argument fails another is immediately off ered. The determi-
4.  I see now that on pp 99-100 I make a concession to the possibility that arguments of a cumula-
tive kind might just work. I think that was wrong. This is an occupational hazard of active work in 
the disentangling of arguments: I was still struggling with the details of the distinction between argu-
ments within a particular framework and arguments about the framework when I had to hand the 
text over to the publisher. If I had worked on it a bit longer, and had time to go through the earlier 
chapter again, I would have seen that those arguments could not justify a principle of prohibition, 
and would be relevant to questions only of policy making that did not take place against the back-
ground of such a principle.
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nation to fi nd some way to justify prohibition has continued unabated since the issue 
fi rst arose.
That being the case, there is the interesting question of what exactly the moti-
vating feeling might be, and I speculate about it in the book. I suspect that it is some-
thing in the broad area of disgust, which has been endlessly rationalized in terms of 
the interests of the interests of the very people—the sick and the badly off —whose 
interests it potentially overrides. But whatever it is, it is objectively clear that it has 
systematically corrupted the arguments so far, and unless it is recognized for what it 
is, it will go on corrupting reasoning about policies – even if the current principled 
objections to payment for organs are theoretically withdrawn.
5. CONCLUSION
Of course K&S are right to say that we should be trying to fi nd the best policies 
all things considered. But my contention is that the deep opposition to allowing paid 
donation systematically obstructs any serious attempt to do this, in two ways.
First, the general prohibition of payment for organ donation rules out of con-
sideration, from the start, indefi nitely many possible policies that might be best all 
things considered. Since prohibition as a principle is unjustifi ed, as long as it remains 
it positively obstructs any genuine eff ort to fi nd out what really would be best. It 
should be abandoned, and we should reopen the whole question from the point of 
view that should have been taken from the start: recognizing that prohibition pre-
vents competent adults from doing what seems to them to be in their best interests, 
and concentrating instead on trying to work out how best to prevent the harms that 
obviously might arise as people try to take advantage of new possibilities open to 
them, while allowing as far as possible for the good.
Second, even if this were done, the evidence of the arguments so far, showing 
a determined resistance to allowing payment, means that the problem would still 
persist in a covert way. Questions about the all—things—considered merits of poli-
cies are immensely complicated and full of factual uncertainties, and hardly ever 
capable of defi nitive answers. In arguments of this kind people with strong intuitions 
about some subject will of course pick out elements of evidence that support what 
they already believe, and still fail to see what they might otherwise recognize as better 
by their own considered standards. There is probably no way of preventing this com-
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pletely, but at least a full awareness of the problem would give us the best possible 
chance.
The organ selling context is of course not the only one in which issues like this 
arise, and where deep preconceptions hide fl aws in arguments that would never be 
made in neutral contexts. It happens in other parts of the organ procurement debate, 
as well as indefi nitely many other kinds of context. It is essential to look out for such 
mistakes. As I say on the cover of the book, if you die from mistakes in moral reason-
ing, you are as dead as if you die from mistakes in medicine.
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